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Japan Report

(FOUO 35/82)



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JAPAN REPORT

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CONTENTS

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

Suzuki's Political Gamble Discussed (Kenji Kitahara; THE DAILY YOMIURI, 21 May 82)	1
Impact of Diet Session Extension on Suzuki Cabinet Examined (Masao Kanazashi; THE JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 25 May 82).....	2
Connections of Tanaka Faction Analyzed (Kiyooki Tsuboi; BUNGEI SHUNJU, May 82)	4
Possible Isolation of Komeito Discussed (Takehiko Takahashi; MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 19 May 82)...	9
Komeito's Diet Strategy Discussed (Takehiko Takahashi; MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 27 May 82)...	11

MILITARY

Japan-U.S. Technological Cooperation Seminar on Launching Reconnaissance Satellite (SANKEI, 12 May 82)	13
--	----

ECONOMIC

Prospects for Long-Term Energy Supply, Demand Given (NIHON KOGYO SHIMBUN, 22 Apr 82)	18
---	----

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

SUZUKI'S POLITICAL GAMBLE DISCUSSED

Tokyo THE DAILY YOMIURI in English 21 May 82 p 2

[From "Political Beat" column by Kenji Kitahara]

[Text]

"Why was the Diet session extended for such a long period?" former premier Kakuei Tanaka asked close associates. "No one told me anything."

This was a joke. Tanaka most certainly knew everything since he is thought to be the mastermind behind the move to extend the Diet.

Revision of the Public Officials Election Law to correct the national constituency election system for the House of Councilors has been a long-pending issue for the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP).

It is nonsense to call clean politics and dissolution of the intraparty factions if the present national constituency which costs each candidate from ¥200 to ¥300 million per campaign is left untouched.

In this sense, it was not bad at all that Tanaka pushed Prime Minister Suzuki to make up his mind to revise the election system regardless of both of their motives.

However, the reason why Suzuki and Tanaka, who had been reportedly reluctant to extend the Diet session, finally decided to force this through is not very clear.

Intraparty observers give several reasons to explain this.

They speculate that it is part of Tanaka's counterattack.

Originally former premiers Takeo Miki and Takeo Fukuda pressed hard for a long extension of the Diet.

Their reason was simple. It had been predicted that the name of Susumu Nikaido, secretary-general of the LDP, would be disclosed as a recipient of money in the verdict of the Lockheed payoff trial due June 8. The two ex-premiers hoped to jolt the Suzuki administration in the midst of a Diet session with this ammunition.

Under this threat, Tanaka decided to go on the offensive and propose extension of the Diet session.

Another reason is that Tanaka and Suzuki do not take the June 8 verdict so seriously.

Many intraparty observers believe that Tomisaburo Hashimoto, former transport minister, and Takayuki Sato, former parliamentary transport vice-minister, both defendants in the trial, will be found guilty and that the name of Nikaido will be mentioned in the judgment.

However, there is also a prediction that Hashimoto will be acquitted and that the name of Nikaido will not be mentioned in the verdict. If this happens, Tanaka and Suzuki will not be hurt by the extension of the Diet session.

Another reason for prolonging the Diet session is that Suzuki would like to perform a great "feat" to repair his image damaged by his sluggish performance as premier.

Suzuki's reelection in the LDP presidential election this coming autumn may prove difficult if his performance continues to be as poor as in the past.

Therefore Suzuki was persuaded to extend the session by Tanaka.

But these reasons are unconvincing to us. Suzuki will be damaged by the Lockheed verdict, will be blamed for the huge revenue shortfall and will take heat for administrative reform bills after the administrative Reform Council makes its recommendations in a lengthened Diet session.

But Suzuki says nothing. Does his silence come from his judgment that his reelection is assured as long as he has the backing of the largest LDP faction led by Tanaka?

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

IMPACT OF DIET SESSION EXTENSION ON SUZUKI CABINET EXAMINED

Tokyo THE JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL in English 25 May 82 p 10

["Political Scene" Column by Masao Kanazashi: "Suzuki Becomes Glum from Diet Extension"]

[Text] Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki was exceptionally glum on that day. Suzuki usually keeps a bright face and tries to be as courteous to others as he possibly can. He often stops his car and takes trouble to answer reporters' questions even if he is in a hurry. On that particular day, however, Suzuki remained glum and mum and quickly got out of his official residence without bothering to answer the reporters hurrying after him, asking questions. On that day, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party decided to make a big extension of the current Diet session (originally scheduled to end on May 19) and notified the speakers of the both Houses of the Diet of the decision.

Suzuki was glum not only because the large-scale extension of the Diet session demolishes his summer holiday plan of playing golf day in and day out in the fashionable resort town of Karuizawa. He is glum mostly because of the complete derailment of his political schedule and the acute sense of chagrin he is feeling about it. Suzuki never dreamed that any long extension of the current Diet session was possible. He was, therefore, flabbergasted when calls for a long-term extension of the Diet session came out of nowhere and immediately gripped the ruling party.

Another reason for Suzuki's displeasure is that the extended part of the Diet session (running to as many as 94 days) is certain to be fraught with risks and pitfalls. For one thing, the court is expected to pass judgment, in the course of the extended part of the Diet session, on the politicians involved in the Lockheed payoff scandal case. If the politicians are found guilty, not only Opposition party members but also many conserva-

tives are certain to call on the Government to take due responsibility.

The Opposition parties also are certain to take the Government to task for the now inevitable revenue shortfalls. Many informants believe that a revenue shortfall totaling some ¥3,000 billion will come to the surface in the course of June when tax revenue figures for fiscal 1981 are made public. Large-scale tax revenue shortfalls also will be inevitable for the current fiscal year ending next March and the Government will not be able to formulate a national budget for fiscal 1983 unless it again issues deficit-financing Government bonds. Such a move goes completely counter to the Suzuki Administration's promises "to reconstruct the nation's finances without any tax increases" and "to cut down the nation's dependence on national bonds to virtual zero in the course of fiscal 1984." If the Suzuki Administration fails to live up to its promises, the Opposition parties will certainly press the Government to take responsibility. Calls for no confidence motions against Finance Minister Michio Watanabe are already being voiced even by some ruling party members.

Administrative reforms, trade frictions with the United States and other countries and defense problems etc. also could prove fatal roadblocks for the Suzuki Administration. Solution to all these crucial problems will never be forthcoming unless Prime Minister Suzuki exerts exceptionally strong leadership. Suzuki is certain to be demanded in the Diet to make his stand clear vis-a-vis all these important problems. It will be extremely difficult for Suzuki to handle all these knotty problems without making any blunders and come out of the battle in glory.

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Suzuki originally hoped to put an early end to the Diet session, thereby minimizing political troubles emanating from the above-cited delicate problems. Suzuki's hope, however, was dashed to pieces when he was forced to accept the Tanaka faction's belief that the Government would be in real trouble if it failed to carry out reformation of the national constituency of the House of Councilors in the current Diet session.

As the final objective of the Suzuki-Tanaka coalition is obvious, namely, reelection of Suzuki in the forthcoming presidential election of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, however, members of the Fukuda faction and other anti-mainstream groups within the ruling party are bristling with indignation.

"You cannot get a tiger cub unless you get into a tiger's cave," states one of Suzuki's lieutenants by way of explaining the Prime Minister's present state of mind. Glum days will continue for Suzuki for some more time.

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

CONNECTIONS OF TANAKA FACTION ANALYZED

Tokyo BUNGEI SHUNJU in Japanese May 82 pp 124-135

[Article by Kiyooki Tsuboi: "The Motivation and Power of the Tanaka Faction's Hidden Candidates"]

[Excerpts] Unbridled Infiltration of Election Districts

It is rumored that Hiromu Nonaka, lieutenant governor of Kyoto Prefecture, will stand as a candidate from Kyoto's Second District in the upcoming general election. He is a Tanaka supporter.

"I have known Mr Kakuei (Tanaka) for about 30 years, since the time when I was mayor of Sonobe, Kyoto Prefecture. Although I was unimportant, he looked after me with kindness on various occasions. He is able to grasp the earthy, provincial outskirts atmosphere and understand it. When asked to do something, everyone says: "Of course." In his case, however, he not only says, "Of course, I understand," but he takes care of it immediately and gets back to you with the result himself--himself, mind you. When my mother died 9 years ago, he sent his secretary to the funeral and not only that, on the occasion of the first Bon Festival, he sent a lantern. Who else does such things? The Lockheed trial? Regardless of the outcome, I am devoted to him. I hope he will continue to guide me in many ways in the future as he has in the past.

Currently Kakuei Tanaka is absorbed in preparing to put up 20 or so new candidates from his own faction. At present, the Tanaka faction in the upper and lower chambers together numbers 109. Including those reputed to be "hidden Tanaka followers," 120 are said to belong to the Tanaka clique. (Liberal Democratic Party leadership) In terms of the posts they hold and funds distribution they control, many believe that the Tanaka group is now more than just a political clique. His recent movements and utterances, which can only be interpreted as an attempt to upgrade the Tanaka faction's membership to 150, is in anybody's estimation, out of the ordinary.

But Tanaka intends to go through with it no matter what. Tanaka has his own logic and that is... no, wait a moment. Even if Tanaka intended to expand his own clique, that is take over the Liberal Democratic Party, he could not force anyone to run with Tanaka faction backing if the person

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were unwilling. If Tanaka has his logic and plan for expansion, there must be corresponding logic and plan on the part of people wanting to represent (or be backed by) the Tanaka faction. There must be a debt of gratitude which makes a man say, "Yes, I will run," when told to announce his candidature. The side that wants to run and the side that wants to support--unless we focus on both sides, we cannot unlock the secret of the Tanaka corps.

Tanaka's extraordinary obsession with the upcoming general election is demonstrated in the indiscriminate infiltration of election districts. No benevolence and honor here. Where there is an opportunity, where there is an unguarded chink in the armor, he is prepared to run his candidate. Even though there is Shosei Hisama, a Tanaka faction legislator, in Nagasaki's First District, Tanaka is prepared to back Masahiko Yamada (lawyer). Although there is Kunikichi Saito--head clerk for the Suzuki faction and a close cohort of Tanaka's--in Fukushima's Third District, he tries to run his son-in-law, Naoki Tanaka. In Kagawa's Second District, which belonged to Masayoshi Ohira--a friend of Tanaka before his death--he is trying to run Shoji Okashita (Ministry of Finance, Fund Management Section chief) in spite of howls from Hajime Morita, Ohira's son-in-law. When the former lower house speaker, Shigesaburo Maeo--another longtime friend--died, while the Maeo supporters were trying to select a successor, Tanaka made an attempt to fill the vacancy (Kyoto's Second District) with the aforementioned Nonaka. Hiroshima's First District is currently represented by Hirokichi Nadao, an opponent of Tanaka but a man who once was the speaker of the lower house; he has not formally announced his retirement as yet. Nevertheless, Toshinobu Kuriya (a former under secretary at the Ministry of Construction) has declared himself as the successor....

In the Liberal Democratic Party, there have been instances where the main force and the opposing force would not yield and the two opposing candidates were put up in order to destroy cliques. But there have not been too many examples of poking interfering fingers into the eyes of the Suzuki faction, which is friendly to Tanaka; or to opposing the incumbent who was won away from another clique by running a true blue Tanaka clique candidate against him. Moreover, the party elders' intentions and the desires of the deceased leaders--such as Ohira, Maeno, Nadao--have never been so trod upon.

The Tanaka faction is like a General Hospital. It is made up of many departments--Construction, Postal Policy, Welfare, Environment, National Railways, Telephone and Telegraph, Sewage, Public Corporation and so on--all under the direction of Tanaka. If Construction cannot find the "cure," then the case is referred to Telephone and Telegraph; if Public Corporation cannot help, then it is passed on to Postal Policy. Well known "section chiefs" such as Tatsuo Ozawa for Environment and Gen Tamura for Sewer System are lined up like glittering stars. When any kind of appeal comes in, regardless of what department receives it initially, a "cure" is effected immediately by the proper branch. It may be put to city, town and village discussion, metropolitan and district discussion, and finally into the

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hands of Diet members. Anything and everything from traffic accidents to major concessions are handled expertly and systematically, on occasion in exchange for money. Director Kakuei of this Tanaka General Hospital does not have to deal directly with the individual cases any longer, he simply collects the department chiefs' takings.

A Liberal Democratic assembly man progresses from under secretary, Policy Affairs Research Council Section chief, House of Representatives/House of Councillors leader and minister. Unless he is taken care of well in this upward mobility, there is no point in belonging to a clique. The secretary general (Susumu Nikaido), the assistant secretary general (Noboru Takeshita) and a few deputy secretaries general have control of the decisionmaking power in this regard. In addition, in the Tanaka faction, the leader himself is more attuned to his clique members' posting than any other political "boss." Thus, within the Tanaka clique, there is a secure feeling that one will reap the benefit of membership sometime; and the members work industriously toward the day when they will attain the post of "department chief" in the Tanaka organization. Therefore, many of them are bound tightly from the minute they decide to join the Tanaka faction. There is no escape. In the first place, their constituencies would not allow it; and there is fear that, if they so much as entertained the idea of defection, there is no telling what kind of vengeance would be taken on them in the next election.

Why Expand?

Finally, the question of the Tanaka clique. Why is it fighting the other cliques and spending colossal amounts of money? (All those interviewed told me that in any election district a new candidate must spend several hundred million yen.) Why does it have to do all that in order to aggrandize itself?

One reason is the uncertainty that Kakuei Tanaka, the penal defendant, suffers from ceaselessly. He is a man afraid to be alone. He is convinced that only kin are reliable, and the more of them the better.

Certainly, politics is "numbers." The fact that he can hold his head high in the Liberal Democratic Party is attributable to the protection the Tanaka faction offers to the current administration with its absolute numerical strength. No matter how superior a clique may be, a minority clique's influence has its limits. So, 110 is better than 100; 120 or 150 would be even better. Should Tanaka be found guilty in the Lockheed trial and a bill for Tanaka's expulsion be introduced in the National Diet, Tanaka would like to have enough power to block its passage.

But Tanaka is constantly balancing cost with results. Thus the motivation is not solely that. He is not necessarily aiming for an actual election win, but for the efficacy of shouting: "We will put up candidates here and there." If there is a problem, then he can always withdraw his candidate, thereby gaining the gratitude of other cliques. He may have learned this

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technique at the time of the inception of the new commercial broadcasting station, when just about everyone applied; then there was a negotiating conference and then the final settlement. The other important motive is the preelection campaigning for the gubernatorial primary election--cultivation of the regional political arena. Neglecting this step could cause grave consequences at a critical time. Moreover, there are numerous side benefits in being able to display a solid pipeline between the central bureaucracy and the district politicians. There is an expression, "Fame begets fame." When the number is large and the time spent in fostering is long, the result will be more efficacious; the fame achieved thereby will draw new followers and the organization will become progressively bigger.

But even the Tanaka clique cannot continue to keep up this expansionist development forever. Although I have stated that the Tanaka faction has an advantage when the pie gets smaller because of its perfected appeal processing system, the situation is quite different when there is no hope of recovering the size of the pie. At present, a high growth rate cannot be hoped for. If this condition is prolonged, the Tanaka faction's admirable appeal processing system may become useless in the near future. Some members of the Tanaka clique--both old and new--are becoming aware of this critical situation.

Moreover, there has been a spread of premonition of the Tanaka faction's downfall. As described before, a certain backer of Dai Shiojima (Nagano Fourth District) states: "I feel resistant toward the Tanaka faction." And a backer of Nagasaki First District's Shosei Hisama says: "Why bother with the Tanaka clique at this point in time." Such comments were previously unheard of in the Tanaka faction or its surroundings. The fact that Hisama delayed his entry into the Tanaka faction was probably due to his own hesitancy. Masakazu Ban (formerly ambassador to China) ran in the previous House of Councillors election on a Shakomin ticket and lost. Immediately thereafter he formalized his association with Tanaka. In the next general election, he intends to run for Kochi Prefecture's at-large seat as a member of the Michio Watanabe group. He is in a great quandary and is vacillating between Tanaka's seemingly powerful figure and an intuition that the clique's disintegration is inevitable. Ban states:

"After losing the House of Councillors election, I visited Mr Tanaka at his Mejiro residence. He asked me if I was interested in engaging in politics as a Liberal Democrat, to think about it and let him know. I thought about it for 4 months but was not able to reach a decision. I was vacillating on how to reconcile my association with Mr Tanaka and the Lockheed issue. I resolved in the end that the outcome of the hearing is known only to God and that it has to be left to chance."

I did not quite comprehend, so I asked him what influence the fact that Tanaka is the defendant has on the current political situation and how he was coping with the ripple effect. He responded: "On that question, no comment." Although he has not reached a decision, he probably wants to leave the sinking ship before it goes totally under. The fact that Tanaka sent Ban to Watanabe is, no doubt, because he sensed this.

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As long as Tanaka can refer matters to someone else, things are going well. In due time, the incumbent Tanaka clique legislators will begin expressing "concern over the faction's decline." Then, Tanaka is found guilty. Should these developments coincide with deepening recession and loss of the Tanaka clique's ability to coordinate the pie distribution, there is danger of the Tanaka faction not being able to save itself because of a mutiny by its members.

Perhaps this is being anticipated, for among the upper stratum of the Tanaka faction, there is an indication of disassembly. Masumi Ezaki, who was not able to secure a ministerial position or any of the party's big three posts; Gen Tamura who became party's Diet Affairs Committee Chairman and yet has not achieved the reputation he should; Tokusaburo Kozaka who in becoming minister of transportation became unpopular within the faction--all these men are outsiders in the Tanaka faction, and they have begun to move on their own. There are those who have started to distribute money without going through the clique, and one person was criticized because he was backing a high-level bureaucrat in the next general election on his own and not the Tanaka faction's candidate. Susumu Nikaido will perhaps be further restricted in his movements depending on the verdicts that Tomisaburo Hashimoto and Takayuki Sato receive in the Lockheed adjudication, and Shin Kanemaru has a health problem.

Under these circumstances much depends on Takeshita's ability to consolidate the clique members and prepare for the worst. It is rumored that Tanaka's chronic anxiety at times turns into suspicion and causes difficulty for Nikaido and Takeshita. In the event that Tanaka is found guilty, some of the executive level members will no doubt desert the organization, taking with them several young and middle-ranking followers. But those that have won less than five rounds of elections all entered the political arena with Tanaka/Takeshita backing. There are many who emphatically state that "these are solidly organized under Takeshita's leadership no matter what."

Takeshita was brought up by Eisaku Sato and Kakuei Tanaka. He is the foremost fund raiser but also has a wide spending channels. His association with the officials extends over 20 years. Even among politicians he has a variety of friends who transcend political and clique barriers. Tanaka's General Hospital can almost be described as Takeshita's creation, so the transfer of power ought to be easy. The people brought in under Tanaka's present extraordinary new face recruiting all have received Takeshita's sanction. Although somewhat different in motivation from Tanaka's reasons for expansion, Takeshita, while representing the Tanaka clique, must also foster the Takeshita clique. Lockheed adjudication, decampment, split, reorganization of the clique--in these situations, the only people he can trust are the underlings he brought up himself. Takeshita is thinking thus.

No doubt, Takeshita is the material and spiritual mentor to the 20 some Tanaka faction new faces up for election. But in addition, he probably has already made formal contacts with other candidates--independents and those representing other cliques--who, taken as a whole, are numerically twice as strong as the Tanaka candidates.

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

POSSIBLE ISOLATION OF KOMEITO DISCUSSED

Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 19 May 82 p 2

[From Nagatacho Doings column by Takehiko Takahashi]

[Text]

The Komeito is the third largest political party following the Liberal-Democratic Party and the Japan Socialist Party. An agreement has been reached earlier by the Komeito with the Japan Socialist Party and the Democratic Socialist Party on a governmental administration concept. Since the JSP and the DSP are in severe confrontation, the Komeito is serving as a bridge between those two political parties.

The proposed revision of the election system for the House of Councillors national constituency, which has now become a problem, is being opposed the strongest by the Komeito. Because of that, the JSP and DSP are encountering trouble carrying out their Diet policies.

The Japan Socialist Party is thinking that it would like to have the House of Councillors national constituency changed into a proportional representation system based on restricted registration of candidates. In the background of this way of thinking is Sohyo (the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan). Nearly all of the JSP's candidates in the national constituency are connected with labor unions. Since the House of Councillors election, which is held every three years, is a big burden

financially for the labor unions that put up candidates, Sohyo would like to see this situation remedied.

Nevertheless, the Komeito, with which an agreement was reached on the administrative concept, is opposing the election system revision this time and the JSP is hesitant about having the revision bill pushed through by the strength of numbers.

JSP Cooperation

In addition, the JSP owes the Komeito a debt. In the local constituencies of the House of Councillors, in the electoral districts where the Komeito does not have candidates, it is cooperating with the JSP. There are places where the JSP is barely able to obtain Diet seats in this way.

If the JSP moves positively in an attempt to revise the election system for the House of Councillors national constituency, the Komeito is liable to refuse further cooperation, putting the JSP in a difficult position.

The Komeito is emphasizing this point as it applies pressure on the JSP.

The Democratic Socialist Party is opposing, as a party, a revision of the election system for the House of Councillors national constituency in the same way as the Komeito. But

in the same way that the JSP is backed by Sohyo, the DSP has Domei (Japanese Confederation of Labor) behind it. Domei is in favor of the revision for the same reason as Sohyo's.

Nevertheless, since both the Komeito and the DSP are in the center of the middle-of-the-road influences and should cooperate, it is difficult for the DSP to take Diet action by moving away from the Komeito.

Another centrist party, New Liberal Club, is in favor of the proposed revision. The NLC's relations with the Komeito are much weaker than in DSP's case. Therefore, although the DSP must keep in step with the Komeito, the NLC need not give this much thought. As a matter of fact, Toshio Yamaguchi, the NLC's secretary general, has already clearly indicated support for the proportional representation system.

The different attitudes toward an extension of the Diet session are closely related with the proposed revision of the Upper House election system. There is also a connection with the verdicts expected to be handed down June 8 in the Lockheed trial (for defendants Tomisaburo Hashimoto and Takayuki Sato).

The Japan Socialist Party, New Liberal Club and anti-

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Kakuei Tanaka influences in the LDP would like to have the Diet session extended for a lengthy period. Besides passing the bill for the revision of the election system, they would like to take up the problem of the shortage of revenue in fiscal 1981 and the problem of the Venice Summit meeting.

As against this, even if the Diet session is prolonged, the Komeito would like to have only a brief extension. During that time, it will oppose the proposed revision of the election system and try to prevent the passage of the revision bill.

Possible Confusion

Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki and those around him would like to realize the proposed revision. But if Takayuki Sato, a Diet member at present, is

found guilty when the verdict is handed down in the Lockheed trial on June 8 and Tanaka is forced to resign his Diet post, undesirable confusion is bound to result. Accordingly, they would like to have only a brief extension of the Diet session and concentrate their efforts during that period on the passage of the revision bill.

They are also on guard that if the Diet extension is for a lengthy period, the Suzuki administration will face a crisis, being pressed in regard to the financial problem.

At present, a lengthy extension of the Diet session seems possible. This will produce unfavorable factors for the Suzuki administration.

At the same time, how the Komeito acts within the opposition is bound to exert a big influence from now on.

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

KOMEITO'S DIET STRATEGY DISCUSSED

Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 27 May 82 p 2

[From "Nagatacho Doings" Column by Takehiko Takahashi: "Uncanny 'Nezumi Hanabi' Strategy"]

[Text]

There is a type of fireworks called "nezumi hanabi." After it is believed to have been extinguished, it suddenly begins to sputter and send out sparks. Secretary General Junya Yano of the Komeito has said, "we will carry out Diet tactics by the 'nezumi hanabi' method from now on."

The current Diet session has been extended 94 days. This is an extraordinarily long extension for a regular Diet session. The biggest reason why the Liberal-Democratic Party carried out such a lengthy extension was in order to revise the election system of the House of Councillors.

Since Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki will be away from June 3 to 18 to attend the Versailles Summit and the United Nations Disarmament Conference, it was originally intended to extend the Diet session up to the time of the prime minister's departure. Suzuki himself seems to have had such thoughts.

It was judged, however, that this would not provide enough time for the election system revision to become law. But if the Diet session were extended and the major purpose of that extension not realized, Prime

Minister Suzuki's political responsibility would be questioned.

On the other hand, even if it were to be a lengthy extension, if the proportional representation method could be introduced for the first time in the House of Councillors' election system, it would be a big political achievement for Suzuki. He began to think that with this as the background, his prospects would improve in the LDP presidential election in November.

Strategy

Up to here, this is the scenario of Prime Minister's Suzuki's handling of his administration. Whether things will proceed according to the scenario depends on the effect of the "nezumi hanabi" strategy which Secretary General Yano has mentioned. If after extending the Diet for 94 days, the revision of the election system of the House of Councillors' national constituency cannot be realized, Prime Minister Suzuki's political responsibility will be questioned not only by the opposition but also from within the LDP.

The aim of the Komeito's fireworks strategy is to prevent

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the revision of the election system. What is necessary to do so is to interrupt Diet deliberations repeatedly.

There must be a reason, of course, for stopping Diet deliberations. Upon making a forecast of the political happenings from now on, considerable material seems to exist for stopping the Diet discussions. This can be divided broadly into the following:

1. On the lengthy extension of the Diet session:

Three political parties — Japan Socialist Party, Komeito, and Japan Communist Party — did not attend the plenary session of the House of Representatives to decide on the extension of the Diet session. The Democratic Socialist Party attended but opposed the extension. The only opposition party giving its approval was the New Liberal Club.

Time Consuming

Every time that the LDP has forcibly carried out a Diet extension in the past, the Diet deliberations have stopped and considerable time has been required before the restoration of normalcy.

In the present case, the JSP, Komeito and JCP have stated that all deliberations will be stopped while Prime Minister Suzuki is abroad. Nor will they engage in discussions up to the time of his departure (except for the resolution on disarmament). Because of such tactics, about 30 days out of the extended 94 days will be wasted.

2. Verdicts in Lockheed

Trial:

Verdicts are scheduled to be handed down on defendants Tomisaburo Hashimoto and Takayuki Sato in the Lockheed trial on June 8. If Sato is adjudged guilty, the opposition will demand his "immediate resignation."

The problem is how the LDP will react to this. The opposition will also demand the establishment of a Political Ethics Committee, which the LDP does not desire to do. Fireworks might start sputtering over this, bringing Diet deliberations to a halt.

3. Shortage of Revenue:

It is said that the shortage of revenue for fiscal year 1981 will exceed 3 trillion yen. This may lead to the questioning of the responsibility of the government, particularly of Finance Minister Michio Watanabe, and develop into a demand for his resignation. This again will stop the Diet's deliberations.

4. Recommendation of the Second Ad Hoc Council:

With the recommendation of the Second Ad Hoc Council on Administrative Reform scheduled to be presented at the end of July, debates will take place involving this.

Upon observing these "nezumi hanabi" tactics for blocking a revision of the House of Councillors' national constituency election system, despite the lengthy 94-day extension, the passage of the revision is by no means certain.

If the revision is not realized, Prime Minister Suzuki is bound to suffer a fatal blow.

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MILITARY

JAPAN-U.S. TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION SEMINAR ON LAUNCHING RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITE

Tokyo SANKEI in Japanese 12 May 82 p 2

[Text] At the "Japan-U.S. Technological Cooperation Seminar on mutual security" held by Fuji Sankei Group's Defense Information Center and Sankei Shimbun, the U.S. proposed, as concrete technological cooperation on the part of Japan and the U.S., that "in order to carry out regular tracking and surveillance of Soviet naval vessels which continue to build up especially in the Pacific Ocean area, Japan and the U.S. launch reconnaissance satellites, establish an ocean surveillance system and cooperate and engage in operations in the northwestern Pacific Ocean." This was proposed as one method for defense of the sealanes between Japan and the U.S. in the northwestern Pacific Ocean and between Japan, the U.S. and the Middle East, which the U.S. government has proposed. But it is notable as a proposal symbolizing that "inasmuch as a British destroyer was destroyed with one guided missile in the Falkland Islands area, modern warfare has already entered a new stage of high technology surveillance and assault with highly efficient guided weapons. (Summary of discussions) (Suetake Yamanaka, editorial committee member, Defense Information Center.)

Japan-Data Analysis for Sealanes Defense

This proposal was a proposal by former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense William Perry in a keynote report and furthermore was a concrete response to a question by Hisao Iwajima, director of the Defense Training Institute's First World War History Research Laboratory. Perry responded: "The field where Japan-U.S. technological cooperation can be usefully developed is in the field of ocean surveillance." Although Perry stated, "At this point in time it cannot be called a system with a concrete division of labor," he also stated that using the new U.S. launched reconnaissance satellites, then having data sent from the satellite received by Japan's ground stations, and having Japan's main responsibility be to take charge of computer processing and having Japan offer a pilot plan for this technological cooperation would be extremely beneficial toward strengthening the Japan-U.S. security system.

At present, it seems that in fact America's ocean surveillance consists only of partial surveillance by means of various early warning aircraft and there is no comprehensive surveillance system regularly or intermittently covering

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the ocean area. Because of this, it seems that the idea of Perry's proposal is to have a regular, intermittent comprehensive surveillance of the ocean in order to deal with the buildup of Soviet naval strength by launching a reconnaissance satellite, and in the northwest Pacific ocean region having the results of Japan's information reception and data processing sent to America, creating a deterrent posture so that, if necessary, the U.S. military which receives the data will take countermeasures with various highly efficient guided weapons.

Japan made no positive reference to this proposal by Perry but is evaluating the points in the proposal on concrete technological cooperation as it directs its attention to the defense of the sea lanes in the northwest Pacific Ocean.

At this seminar, there were lively discussions day and night about U.S.-Japan cooperation in terms of military technology and nonmilitary technology, and following the previous example of cooperative development and production of missile weapons used by American and the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) countries, the proposal that there must be agreement on the necessary terms for military technological cooperation between Japan and the U.S. was made by both countries. Besides this, America stressed carrying out possible technological cooperation between Japan and the U.S. as quickly as possible in a format which does not contradict Japan's constitution or the three fundamental principles on weapons exports.

At the "Japan-U.S. Technological Cooperation Seminar on Mutual Security" held at the Japan Press Center in Uchisaiwaicho on the 11th, eleven Japanese and U.S. experts held lively discussions. Many questions were submitted--such as the question of the defense of the Pacific Ocean sea lanes, the lifeline of the U.S. and Japan, and whether or not there will be a Soviet attack on Japan. Likewise, concerning technological cooperation, there were ideas such as cooperation on an ocean surveillance system vis-a-vis the Soviet naval power. Besides this, such gaps as the restrictions from Japan's three fundamental principles on weapons exports toward Japan-U.S. military technological cooperation stood out in bold relief; and future problems were thrown up. (Hiroshi Iwano, editorial staff member; Tadaaki Yoshii, assistant director of the news staff)

Necessary Strengthening of Ocean Surveillance Capability

[Perry] During these past 10 years, the USSR has been allowed to increase greatly its military strength in the Pacific Ocean region. They have stationed nuclear submarines and backfire cruisers, and their nuclear capability has increased fivefold. The threat to China has increased twofold, but the threat to Japan has not increased to that degree. Rather, with the threat of their military power the USSR is trying to pull Japan, a U.S. ally, away from the U.S.; in other words, the USSR is trying to "Finlandize" Japan. There is the danger of war occurring accidentally due to Soviet miscalculation; and it is necessary to have a deterrent force toward such a war.

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Soviet labor costs are cheap, and it can transfer large military expenditures into supplies of weapons; there is the danger of a military imbalance between us and the USSR.

It is necessary for us to apply our technological cooperation to oppose the Soviet military challenge. Especially, in order for Japan and the U.S. to secure the sea lanes of the Pacific Ocean sphere, we must build up our surveillance of Soviet military strength. Japan also must not forget the defense of its territory; especially, defense against submarines is necessary and, if possible, application of electronics to such things as sonobuoys should be made.

[Bansho] Despite the fact that Japan has the three fundamental principles on weapons exports, and Japan and the U.S. are allies which have contracted the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, we have been discreet in weapons exports. The Japanese government should handle this so that it is possible to export weapons and supply weapon technology to the U.S.

On the other hand, Japan is doing licensed production of U.S. equipment, such as the F15J fighter and the P3C sub-spotting plane, but recently the cost of importation from the U.S. to Japan has increased, and also introduction of the newest technology has become difficult. It is said that reexamination of license contracts is being made in order to protect employment within the U.S. and predominance of the U.S. defense industries. We desire a consistent posture on the part of the U.S.

[Augustine] It isn't that difficult to assign the Japan-U.S. cooperative relationship in commerce to defense. For example, there are planes, ships and vehicles. However, there is the profit that comes from being allies in shifting technology from the U.S. to Japan. What does Japan think about the flow of military technology transferred to Japan to the field of commerce?

[Nakama] There is an example in the past of a U.S. license being applied to Japan's new weapons and the U.S. laying claim to it; but that is not the case now.

[Perry] Without waiting for Japan to revise the three fundamental principles on weapons exports, we should try it in an experimental field.

Maintaining Secrets Difficult in Japan

[Nakama] In the supply of technology from the U.S., the black box (a part not supplying any technology or know-how) has increased, but is that a matter of security?

[Bloom] There is a difference in the exchange of defense information between the U.S. and Japan and the U.S. and NATO. The reason why there is an imbalance in terms of secrets between Japan and NATO is that in Japan's constitution the penalty for disclosing information is small, and preserving a secret in Japan is difficult.

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[Iwajima] Even concerning joint development, there is a great perception gap between the people of the U.S. and Japan about weapons. On account of this, no matter what is done, it is necessary to create a system which can clearly be regulated by both countries. I think weapons which the ordinary Japanese wants in the future are roughly the following weapons I have considered. Those for the Americans are bound to be quite different.

First of all, the U.S. wants "invisible bombers" and "invisible missiles," but Japan wants "invisible reconnaissance planes." With these, we will secretly patrol the four islands of the northern territories. Besides these, I think we would want guided devices allowing us to change the direction of incoming enemy missiles and return them to enemy territory, submarines which fly in the air, and a system of terrorist countermeasures. As for the present, perhaps it would be the small scale PGM weaponry.

[Bloom] Regarding joint production and joint development, Japan has taken a great interest in NATO. In Japan's case, because it has the three fundamental principles on weapons exports, there is also the opinion that Japan will not go the way of NATO, but I think this depends on how it is done.

Regarding this, I recollect the role played by the technology for the Delta rocket (Delta 2914) which the U.S. supplied to Japan in the past. This was accomplished in an agreement between the two governments, and there was opposition because this model of rocket could be converted into an intermediate range ballistic missile. But I think overall everything went well. In that instance, along with the technology, the U.S. offered its expertise in launching and the controls to put the satellite into orbit.

I think this was a wise purchase for Japan. The reason is that it gave Japan the technology and experience at a very low cost compared to developing it from the start. With this as the base, Japan developed a much larger rocket and launched its own meteorological satellite and communication satellite designed by Japan. The rate at which the U.S. offered technology decreased year by year. It is very beneficial for emergency communication for Japan to have its own communication satellite. Japan-U.S. technological cooperation in the field of so-called soft military technology which can be used not only for purely military reasons but also in emergencies should advance.

Contradictions in the Soviet Attack Opinion

[Tsukamoto] In Perry's report, it was said that because the USSR does not have sufficient military transport means in the Far East area, there cannot be a Soviet attack on Japan, but I think this is a misconception. As an example of that, it was understood that Nazi Germany could not attack the British homeland, but Britain at that time maintained a serious national defense force and its air force secured mastery of the skies over the British homeland. I think this is different from present day Japan. We have acquired information that the USSR has enough strength to attack Japan.

[Perry] I think that the Soviet Far East Army does not have the capability of making an attack on Japan possible, including its means of sea transport

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and air transport. Moreover, I do not think the Soviet air war capability can counteract the effectiveness of Japan's interceptor fighters; and if it is considered that the U.S. navy would intervene, a Soviet attack could be confronted and checked.

[Bansho] In today's seminar, we see several gaps between Japan and the U.S. 1) Defense budgets; 2) the relative importance of research and development in those budgets; and 3) the position of the defense problem in Japan and the problem of a consensus of the people. It is understood that we must be sufficiently cognizant of these.

Concerning the form of military technological cooperation, first of all, it cannot be implemented without clarifying the three fundamental principles on weapons exports. On account of this, a political resolution is necessary and after the framework is prepared, it is possible to have the same kind of cooperation as in the nonmilitary fields. I think that both Japan and the U.S. must put great effort into these points.

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ECONOMIC

PROSPECTS FOR LONG-TERM ENERGY SUPPLY, DEMAND GIVEN

Tokyo NIHON KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 22 Apr 82 p 1

[Text] The Comprehensive Energy Research Committee (an advisory organ to the MITI minister chaired by Mr Hiromi Arisawa) Supply and Demand Division held a meeting on 21 April and completed its revision of "The Prospect for the Long-Term Supply and Demand of Energy." It was reported to and acknowledged by MITI Minister Abe. According to the report, the total energy demand in FY-90 is estimated to be 590 million kiloliters (oil equivalent). Demand has been revised downward 15.71 percent from the tentative forecast compiled in August 1979. The reasons for the change are the economic slump and an increase in the rate of energy conservation, which is expected to rise to 15.5 percent (in the previous forecast it was 14.8 percent). As a result, oil dependency falls from the previous 50 percent (350 million kiloliters) to 49.1 percent (290 million kiloliters), and breaks the 50-percent level for the first time. On the other hand, the ratios of coal and nuclear power to the total energy demand rise from 17.6 percent and 10.9 percent to 19.5 percent and 11.3 percent respectively. The nuclear power ratio, in particular, will jump up to 18 percent (90 million kilowatts) in FY-2000 and become the third most important energy source, trailing only oil and coal. This is the most characteristic point in the new forecast, which will be used as a guideline in formulating energy policies hereafter. The domestic and overseas situations are, however, still uncertain. Therefore, this forecast will require revision again within a year or two.

Corrected Downward by 15.71 Percent

Oil Dependency Breaks the 50-Percent Level; Increase in the Nuclear Power Ratio

In order to predict long-term energy demand and secure energy supplies, MITI and the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (ANRE) estimate "The

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Prospect for the Long-Term Supply and Demand of Energy." According to the forecast prepared in August 1979, total energy demand (oil equivalent) would be 582 million kiloliters in FY-85, 700 million kiloliters in FY-90 and 870 million kiloliters in FY-95.

After the second oil shock, however, the domestic and overseas energy situations have changed greatly. Especially within Japan, the progress of energy conservation measures supported jointly by the government and private sector and cancellation of the joint Japan-U.S.-West Germany coal liquefaction project caused discrepancies in the previous forecast. Therefore, ANRE as the principal drafter has been working on a revision of the previous forecast that changes the target fiscal years to 1995 and 2000.

The most characteristic point in the new forecast is that the estimation of energy demand is corrected downward by a large percentage. It is estimated at 590 million kiloliters for FY-90 and 770 million kiloliters in the trial calculation for FY-2000, which is even less than the previous estimate for FY-95 (870 million kiloliters). The prospective need for oil, in particular, drops to 290 million kiloliters in both FY-90 and 2000 (approximately 4.97 million barrels per day). As a result, the prospective oil dependency is lowered to 49.1 percent for FY-90 and 38 percent for FY-2000. Crude oil imports are estimated at 230 million kiloliters, slightly less than 4 million barrels per day. The decrease is more than 2.3 million barrels below the 6.3 million barrels per day of the previous estimate.

Coal supply is estimated at 153 million tons for FY-90. Of that, domestic coal supply is estimated at 18 to 20 million tons. The basic policy of a 20-million ton production structure remains. Imported steam coal is estimated at approximately 53 million tons, just over 80 percent of the total. The coal supply for FY-2000 is estimated at 200 million tons, an increase of over 30 percent. However, the ratio of coal to the total energy supply is expected to remain the same.

On the other hand, nuclear power is estimated at 46 million kilowatts for FY-90, about a 12.5-percent decrease from the 51 to 53 million kilowatts of the previous estimate. This is "due to the prospect that nuclear energy expected to be generated by five nuclear reactors will not be supplied until later years because of siting difficulties" (ANRE). Electric power demand share of total energy demand is expected to increase from the 33 percent of FY-80 to 37 percent (its annual rate of increase is 4.2 percent). Consequently, the ratio of nuclear energy in total energy demand is estimated to be 11.3 percent for FY-90 and is expected to jump 18 percent (90 million kilowatts) for FY-2000.

New fuels and types of energy supply are estimated at 15 million kiloliters (oil equivalent) in FY-90, less than half the 38 million kiloliters of the previous estimate. Their share of total energy demand is also expected to fall from the 5 percent of the previous forecast to 2.5 percent. This is due to cancellation of the coal liquefaction project. However, new fuels and types of energy as a share of total energy demand for FY-2000 are estimated to be 8 percent--65 million kiloliters--thanks to the diffusion of solar water heaters and other factors.

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Prospect for Long-Term Energy Supply and Demand					
(fiscal year)	FY-80 (actual)	FY-90	FY-2000 (trial calculation)		
Energy demand		590 million kl	770 million kl		
Energy conservation rate	429 million kl	15.5%	25%		
Coal		quantity	quantity	ratio (Z)	ratio (Z)
(Of this, domestic coal)	92.4 million tons	153 million tons	±200 million tons	19.5	19
(Of this, steam coal)	18.1 million tons	18-20 million tons			
	21.3 million tons	66 million tons			
Nuclear power	15.7 million kw	46 million kw	±90 million kw	11.3	18
Natural gas	25.9 million kl	68 million kl	±82 million kl	11.5	11
(Of this, domestic natural gas)	2.2 billion m ³	7.3 billion m ³			
(Of this, LNG)	16.8 million tons	43 million tons			
Hydroelectric power					
(general hydroelectric power	19 million kw	23.5 million kw	±30 million kw	5.0	5
{pumping-up	10.8 million kw	22 million kw	±33 million kw		
Geothermal energy	300,000 kl	6 million kl	±15 million kl	1.0	2
New fuel oil, new energy, others	700,000 kl	15 million kl	±65 million kl	2.5	8
Oil	285 million kl	290 million kl	±290 million kl	49.1	38
(Of this, domestic oil)	500,000 kl	1.9 million kl			
(Of this, LPG)	14 million tons	24 million tons			
Total supplies	429 million kl	590 million kl	±770 million kl	100.0	100

(Note) (1) Converted to crude oil equivalents at 9,400 Kcal/l. (2) Coal includes coal used for coal fluid mixtures and coal gasification. (3) Domestic coal excludes rough coal. (4) New fuel oils, new types of energy and others include oils from coal liquefaction, oil sands and oil shale; alcohol fuels; solar energy; firewood; charcoal; etc. (5) The percentage totals do not necessarily equal 100 percent due to rounding.

[Commentary by reporter Yoshitatsu Furudate]

"Closer" to the Actual Condition

While the domestic and overseas situations are uncertain, the committee has somehow made a realistic estimate which is close to actual conditions. This is certainly progress compared with the previous forecasting work, and this forecast deserves to be evaluated on its own. Total energy demand for FY-90, however, assumes an average annual economic growth rate of 5 percent from FY-80. As for industrial structure, which is closely and inseparably related to energy demand, the committee used the Industrial Structure Council's report of May 1980 on "Prospects and Problems of the Industrial Structure in the 1980's" as the basis for its forecast, although reference is also made to recent economic conditions. However, everybody admits that a 5-percent economic growth rate is extremely difficult to achieve. The industrial structure, especially the materials industries such as the 70,000-ton aluminum output assumed in FY-90, is likely to change suddenly and drastically in the future. Considering all these factors, the new prospect still contains questionable points.

For example, coal demand, next in importance to oil, is based on the assumption that "the prices of coal and oil will never be reversed in the future." However, there is a movement among coal-producing countries to impose export taxes on coal. The movement toward price control by "coal majors" may strengthen but will never weaken. In regard to new energy sources, the forecast incorporates a rather radical estimate of increases from 15 million kiloliters (2.5 percent) in FY-90 to 65 million kiloliters (8 percent) in FY-2000. This radical increase is based on the assumption that solar water heaters will be widely used. But the diffusion of solar water heaters also faces real problems. "Unless the price of oil sharply rises, the demand for solar water heaters cannot be expected to rise, and consequently, cost reductions stemming from mass production come very slowly" (a major solar manufacturer).

In this forecast the energy conservation rate is increased from the previous estimate of 14.8 percent to 15.5 percent for FY-90 and 25 percent for FY-2000. Not a few people point out that energy conservation measures have been more effective than anticipated and question whether or not any room remains for further conservation or any new measures are available for further conservation. Concerning nuclear energy, although its share of total demand is revised upward slightly, the absolute quantity is lower. It is true that many voices say additional efforts to increase the nuclear power are desirable insofar as the forecast advocates promotion of nuclear power plant siting as a basic national policy. Since this forecast will be used as an important guideline for making energy policies hereafter, the committee's efforts in preparing a general forecast and fulfilling its charge will be sought.

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